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The French Administrative Court’s Rulings
on Compensation Claims Brought by Jewish
Survivors of World War II
RÉMI ROUQUETTE†
_______________________

I. INTRODUCTION
The politics of collaboration during the Nazi occupied Vichy
government involved important anti-Semitic components, as much
against French Jews (who were stripped of their French nationality
before their deportation and extermination) as against foreign Jews:
namely, refugees who had fled the anti-Semitic policies of their
countries of origin. The Vichy government put in place laws of
exclusion from society (Jews were prohibited from employment in
most jobs and were subject to employment quotas, etc.) and the
aryanization of assets,1 which plunged the majority of the Jewish
population into misery at best or an ignominious death at worst.
Starting with the implementation of the final solution (the Wansee
Conference, at which the Nazis decided on the ―final solution,‖ was
held on January 20, 1942), the Vichy government used police and
gendarmes to arrest massive numbers of Jews, as in the infamous
† Docteur en droit public (Ph.D. in Administrative Law), Habilitation à la
Direction de la Recherche (grants authority to supervise the research and writing of
legal dissertations).
1. ―Aryanization‖ refers to the forcible dispossession of Jews of their property,
with Jewish-owned businesses to be run by non-Jews, now referred to as ―Aryans‖
in order to place the context of Judaism and its opposite in an allegedly racial,
rather than religious, context. See, e.g., Emmanuelle Triol, L’Aryanisation des
biens: L’application judiciaire du statut des Juifs, in JUGER SOUS VICHY, LE DROIT
ANTISÉMITE DE VICHY 61–71 (Maurice Olender ed., 1996).
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round-up of the Vel d’Hiv.2 Mostly, but not exclusively, they rounded
up those who were foreigners or who retroactively were deprived of
French citizenship.3 For logistical reasons, the repression was even
worse in the North than in the so-called ―free‖ zone in the South.
When France was liberated, an August 9, 1944 Order put an end to
these measures and, generally, to all those which were contrary to
republican principles. The annulment of the Vichy ―laws‖ has been
deemed to apply retroactively to most of its measures and most
notably to its racial legislation. However, there was no special
provision for reparations; the survivors received the same
compensation as war victims. The restitution of expropriated property
was never even complete, which eventually led to compensatory
measures in the 1990s.
This cleaning up of the legal order was accompanied by debate
among French people initiated by General de Gaulle’s calling the
Vichy government ―an aside‖ and rejecting all responsibility for
official acts that had gone against republican principles. On the legal
level, there was denial of liability: inasmuch as the harms resulted
from acts specific to the Vichy government, based on the voided
legislation, they were not compensable, whereas the most ordinary
harms (e.g., automobile accidents) were compensable. Likewise,
appeals to administrative law judges were also rejected for the same
reason.
With the progression of historical research and the concomitant
lessening of resistance within French society, little by little, the
French came to acknowledge that the Vichy government also had
2. The round-up derived its name from the herding of whole families into the
Vélodrome d’hiver, a Paris indoor track located near the Eiffel Tower. It is to this
mass arrest which occurred in July 1942 that President Chirac was referring in the
1995 speech from which M. Rouquette quotes. See infra, note 5.
3. On July 22, 1940, Vichy promulgated a law to denaturalize foreign-born
citizens who had become naturalized pursuant to France’s law of August 10, 1927,
known as the loi Crémieux. Vichy created a commission empowered to review the
citizenship of each and every citizen naturalized under that law. The 1927 law was
used as the benchmark because it had facilitated the citizenship acquisition process
and because it was widely believed that most of France’s foreign-born Jewish
citizens had been naturalized thereunder. See Loi du 22 juillet 1940, Journal
Officiel de la République Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 23,
1940, p. 4567; MICHAEL R. MARRUS & ROBERT O. PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE AND
THE JEWS 324–25 (1995). See also generally Vivian Grosswald Curran, The
Legalization of Racism in a Constitutional State: Democracy’s Suicide in Vichy
France, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1998).
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been France, and it also had been the French State. Two major events
marked this revolution in the way the French viewed the Vichy
government: Jacque Chirac’s 1995 speech about the Vel d’Hiv; and
the Papon trials. To this must be added, although certainly of lesser
importance, the case involving the decree that indemnified Jewish
orphans, which was the source of the Lipietz lawsuit.
In the speech delivered by President Jacques Chirac at the
ceremony commemorating the July 1942 round-up, President Jacques
Chirac stated:
Fifty-three years ago, on July 16, 1942, 450 French police
officers and gendarmes, under the authority of their (French)
superiors, complied with Nazi demands.
On that date, in the capital and in the region surrounding
Paris, nearly 10,000 Jewish men, women and children were
arrested in the early hours of the morning in their homes and
taken to police stations. One saw scenes of atrocity: families
torn apart, mothers separated from their children, the elderly—
some of whom were World War I veterans, who had shed their
blood for France—shoved ruthlessly into buses and vans of the
Paris police. One would also see some police officers who
looked the other way, allowing a few people to escape.
For all those people who were arrested, a long and painful
descent into hell had just started. How many among them were
never to see their homes and families again? And how many,
at that moment, felt betrayed? And what kind of distress did
they endure?
France, land of the Enlightenment and of the Rights of
Man, a land of welcoming and of refuge, France, on that day,
committed an irreparable act. Breaking its promise, it delivered
those whom she should have protected to their executioners.
Driven to the Velodrome d’hiver, the victims had to endure
several days under horrible conditions, about which we know,
before being taken to one of the transit camps—Pithiviers or
Beaune-la-Rolande—set up by the Vichy authorities.
The horror, however, had only just begun. More round-ups
and more arrests were to follow—in Paris and in the provinces.
Seventy-four trains would leave for Auschwitz. Seventy-six
thousand Jews would be deported from France, never to return.
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We continue to owe them a timeless4 debt.5
The speech of the President of the Republic acknowledged the
continuity of the State, even when the most horrible government is in
power. The speech was challenged incidentally for this very reason,
but the speech was not a juridical act.
The Papon trial did add a legal aspect to this subject, and what a
dimension: indeed, a criminal one. It was, first of all, a criminal trial
that resulted in the only condemnation in our time of a high
government official of the Vichy government, an official who had,
afterwards under the Fifth Republic, pursued an administrative6 and
political career.
But Papon, convicted by the cour d’assises de Bordeaux, [i.e., the
trial court], maintained before the Conseil d’Etat7 that the
government should have rendered him harmless because he had acted
in his capacity as a civil servant (which is the common law principle).
The Conseil d’Etat accepted this reasoning8 by agreeing that a part of
Papon’s mistakes had been committed while he was a civil servant
although it found that he had been acting as a private individual for
the rest. The legal and political novelty was mainly that: by agreeing
with Papon that the French government should indemnify him, the
Court was admitting that the current government could be held liable
for the wrongdoings committed by the Vichy government.
Moreover, the Papon decision followed the Pelletier decision.9
4. The French word is imprescriptible, connoting both timeliness and an act not
subject to a statute of limitations.
5. President Jacques Chirac, Remarks delivered at the Ceremony
Commemorating Vel d’Hiv, the July 1942 Round-Up (July 16, 1995) (on file with
author).
6. He was also responsible for the massacres of Algerians in 1962, when he was
chief of police in Paris.
7. The Conseil d’Etat is the highest administrative court, theoretically with the
sole function of quashing lower court decisions, but it also has jurisdiction as a
court of first and last resort in connection with certain trials of high-ranking
government officials, as was the case for Papon when he sought to obtain
indemnification from the French government for the judgment against him.
8. Conseil d’Etat [CE Sect.] (High-administrative Court), Apr. 12, 2002, CE
Sect., Rec. Lebon 139, concl. Mme Boissard (Fr.), available at http://arianeinternet.
conseil-etat.fr/arianeinternet/ViewRoot.asp?View=Html&DMode=Html&PushDire
ctUrl=1&Item=1&fond=DCE&Page=1&querytype=advanced&NbEltPerPages=5&
Pluriels=True&dec_id_t=238689.
9. Conseil d’Etat [CE Ass.] (High-administrative Court), Apr. 6, 2001, CE Ass.,
Rec. Lebon 173, concl. M. Austry, available at http://arianeinternet.conseil-
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That decision had validated a decree which allotted an indemnity to
individuals who had become orphaned during the war due to the
deportation of their parents as Jews. But in that case, the Conseil
d’Etat had stated, albeit in dictum, that no principle of government
nonliability existed with respect to acts committed by the Vichy
government. The words were clear: ―although the decree which was
attacked aimed to acknowledge the sufferings endured by the orphans
of certain victims of the deportations, it does not change the
conditions under which individuals, who believe they are entitled
pursuant to it, can file lawsuits against the government.‖ The Conseil
d’Etat therefore encouraged the survivors to look for government
liability based on the anti-Semitic legislation, which Mr. Georges
Lipietz was the first to do.
It is in this context that the Lipietz lawsuit took place in the early
2000s and instilled immense hope among survivors (Part II); a hope
that was to be snuffed out a few years later by the Hoffman decision
(Part III).
II. THE HOPES OF SURVIVORS
Starting with the Pelletier decision, survivors of the dark years10
had some hope of seeing the government held liable. On the one
hand, the idea was rejected that the post-war Republic of France
could not be held responsible for the crimes of a government that in
fact had come in under the Nazi boot. On the other hand, the question
of the statute of limitations appeared to be surmountable.
A. The Decision of the Administrative Court of Toulouse
This is exactly what happened, since by its June 6, 2006 judgment
the Administrative Court of Toulouse, after having rejected defense
arguments based on lack of jurisdiction and the statute of limitations,
held the government and the SNCF liable to compensate the
plaintiffs, with one third of the damages assigned to the SNCF.
One will note that the case was filed in 2001, but the court ruled
only in 2006. This delay was exceptionally long, even for that time,
etat.fr/arianeinternet/ViewRoot.asp?View=Html&DMode=Html&PushDirectUrl=1
&Item=1&fond=DCE&Page=1&querytype=advanced&NbEltPerPages=5&Pluriels
=True&dec_id_t=224945.
10. The reference in the original to the dark or ―black years‖ is the term
commonly used to describe the years of Nazi Occupation. See, e.g., JEAN
GUÉHENNO, JOURNAL DES ANNÉES NOIRES 1940–44 (1947).
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which most likely can be explained by a certain discomfort.
B. Jurisdiction
The issue of the Administrative Court’s jurisdiction was a real
consideration only with respect to the SNCF’s liability. 11 The
Administrative Court held that it had jurisdiction due to the fact that
the SNCF was acting within the scope of governmental authority
when it transported Jews to the internment camps. The
Administrative Court therefore applied the normal legal criterion in
its reasoning. Subsequently, the Administrative Court of Appeals,
and later the Conseil d’Etat,12 hearing, respectively, the appeals of the
SNCF and the Lipietz plaintiffs, decided to set aside this legal
criterion, deeming that only the government truly had acted within
the scope of governmental authority, as if the SNCF had had no
autonomy [and that, therefore, the administrative courts lacked
jurisdiction over the SNCF].
The Conseil d’Etat deigned no more than to decide the case as an
ordinary proceeding, in contrast to the far more careful attention it
had paid to the appeal for indemnification previously brought by
Papon against the government.
Most of all, the Conseil d’Etat reviewed the assessment of the facts
which governed jurisdiction in a strange manner. It clearly indicated
that, as far as it was concerned, the SNCF was not liable and that only
the government was at fault. This ruling obviously discouraged other
lawsuits. Above all, one may criticize the Court, which was supposed
to decide only the appellate trial, for plunging into the heart of the
initial trial and thereby usurping the very authority that it just
declared to belong to the judge for criminal law matters.
What is strange in this decision is not the rule of law that was
applied. The latter did not come as a surprise, and it was what the
petitioners consistently invoked (contrary to what the SNCF argued,
which was that the interned individuals were ordinary passengers
11. The SNCF, a government-owned company before the war, had become a
government-owned industrial and commercial company in 1982; as with all
institutions of this kind, private business law applies to it, public (i.e.,
administrative) law becoming applicable when issues of governmental authority
arise.
12. Conseil d’Etat [CE] (High-administrative Court), Dec. 21, 2007, CE, Rec.
Lebon 139, concl. Mme L. et autres (Fr.), available at http://www.conseiletat.fr/cde/node.php?articleid=823.
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using industrial or commercial services). The surprise is that the
Conseil d’Etat denied that the SNCF had been acting within the
scope of governmental authority on the basis of a lapidary analysis,
following a somewhat summary opinion,13 without questioning
whatsoever the theoretical content, not even the concrete dimension
of the nature of acting within the scope of governmental authority.
Thus, under its reasoning, the issuance of a certification of
shipworthiness by a private company would come within the
Administrative Court’s jurisdiction, since in such a case conduct
within the scope of governmental authority would exist,14 whereas the
transporting of human beings in sealed cattlecars is not evidence of
such conduct.
Actually, the Conseil d’Etat shirked its responsibility, deeming
that it should share the task of handling the last lawsuits of the
Second World War with the criminal law courts. In reality, one
should not look for a legal reason in a solution that at heart was just
an opportunistic decision.
The analysis of the SNCF’s role in fact was completely erroneous.
The report, kept virtually confidential, commissioned by the SNCF
and submitted by the researcher, Mr. Bachelier, revealed quite clearly
that the SNCF was zealous and did not even abide by the barely
minimal requirements that Vichy had ordered [for the train transport
towards the camps] when it even refused to provide water and access
to toilets and limited humanitarian stops because the Red Cross
interference slowed down the trains, etc. Moreover, the SNCF
required payment for its services. Bachelier’s report largely
dismantled the myth of the SNCF as having been part and parcel of
the French Resistance. It showed that the majority of the SNCF
leadership collaborated with the Nazis and that the railway workers
who were part of the French Resistance opposed the SNCF. By some
sort of sleight of hand, the Administrative Court of Appeals of
Bordeaux and the Conseil d’Etat deleted the SNCF’s responsibility.
Certainly on a formal level, these courts ruled only that they had no
13. The government commissioner, who has since become a rapporteur public,
is to provide the administrative courts with a detailed opinion concerning the trial.
14. SA Bureau Véritas et autres, Nos. 33803 & 34462, Conseil d’Etat [CE]
(High-administrative Court), Mar. 23, 1983, concl. M. Denoix de Saint Marc,
available at http://arianeinternet.conseil-etat.fr/arianeinternet/ViewRoot.asp?Vie
w=Html&DMode=Html&PushDirectUrl=1&Item=1&fond=DCE&Page=1&queryt
ype=advanced&NbEltPerPages=5&Pluriels=True&dec_id_t=33803.
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jurisdiction (which however was nevertheless largely exercised
against the SNCF) under the rationale that according to them only the
State was liable. It should be emphasized that the chances of success
in the criminal law courts are difficult to assess: one person, Mr.
Schaechter,15 failed in the Paris Court of Appeals, but well before the
SNCF’s specific role had been revealed by the Bachelier report.
C. The Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations had been set aside by the Administrative
Court of Toulouse. With respect to the government, that had been
very easy, the statute of limitations having been argued in a most
irregular manner, probably on the order of higher ups (President
Chirac was still in power), thereby allowing the government to
respect the President’s words without giving the impression of
deliberately losing the lawsuit. But the Administrative Court of
Toulouse did not abide by this procedural aspect. It set aside the
statute of limitations by reasoning that it had not been possible for the
plaintiffs to act before the April 12, 2002 Papon decision, the ruling
which had, as previously mentioned, assigned liability for the first
and last time for acts of the Vichy government. For the SNCF, the
Administrative Court of Toulouse considered that the information
needed to establish its liability had been known only after the
beginning of 1996, the year the aforementioned Bachelier Report was
completed.
D. Reaction
Once the Administrative Court of Toulouse’s decision became
public, it caused a huge amount of debate in the media and on the
Internet. By contrast, the government remained totally silent. French
legal journals also made very little commentary on the decision.
Apart from a few anti-Semitic attacks (the majority of which were
implicit rather than explicit because French law prohibits them), the
decision was criticized for a whole host of reasons. Some objected to
the trial for having occurred so long after the relevant events had
taken place, forgetting that any lawsuit had been strictly impossible
before. Others objected to a lawsuit against the Republic, rehashing
15. Mr. Schaechter, recently deceased, had discovered the bills that the SNCF
had sent to the government for payment for the transportation of Jews, much to the
displeasure of certain historians who were upset that a person not formally trained
had accomplished the research that they should have done.
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old arguments, such as Vichy was just ―an aside,‖ deeming that all of
the harm had come from the Nazis. Others, very numerous,
maintained a view, which later on influenced other administrative
courts, that the compensation should be symbolic only, which seems
to us to be a form of disguised anti-Semitism that stems from the
myth of Jewish cupidity. The fact that one almost never hears this
type of criticism in situations where it would make sense (for
example in defamation suits) only reinforces this analysis.16
Sometimes, solely the verdict against the SNCF was disputed,
rehashing the myth of the State’s17 making the SNCF into an
institution of the French Resistance, when in fact it was essentially, if
not exclusively, on the side of collaboration, except for the few
instances where railway workers sided with the Resistance and
against the SNCF management of the time. The Jewish community,
curiously, strongly defended the SNCF, which raised suspicions that
this defense was linked to the SNCF’s monetary contributions to the
remembrance of the Shoah. Let us also add that a part of the Jewish
community criticized the fact that individuals had brought lawsuits
on their own, even though many people who were persecuted based
on the racially discriminatory laws never considered themselves to be
Jewish because they were atheists or had converted to another
religion long before. Finally, one must signal that part of the public
believed, in part because of the false information published in
newspapers, that the trial had been brought in Toulouse by Mr. Alain
Lipietz, then well known as a member of the European Union’s
Green Party, when in fact, like his sisters and his mother, he merely
succeeded in interest to his father, following the latter’s death in
2003.
Elsewhere, from the victims’ point of view, the decision of the
Administrative Court of Toulouse created a great sense of hope.
More than a thousand petitions were filed with the French
administrative courts by survivors or their relatives, represented by at
least fifteen lawyers.18 The victims had even more hope inasmuch as
16. This argument is not without analogy to those put forth by sexists who
blame women who have been raped for asking the courts to require that the rapists
compensate them.
17. The myth is illustrated by René Clément’s movie La Bataille du Rail and
Paul Durand’s hagiographic book la SNCF pendant la guerre.
18. Let it be known that the author of this paper, who represented the jointly
interested Lipietz parties, never took on another case of this kind but provided
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the government had not appealed the Toulouse decision in favor of
Lipietz (only the SNCF had appealed). Unfortunately, the new
leadership of the French State changed the lay of the land. President
Sarkozy, hostile to repentance and advised by Mr. Klarsfeld, himself
very hostile to the Lipietz family lawsuit, clearly gave instructions to
state authorities to systematically defend all of the appeals, which
was done.
III. THE CRUSHING OF HOPE
There is a procedure in the administrative courts and the
administrative courts of appeal that allows them to request an opinion
from the Conseil d’Etat. This system, disputable in its theory because
it is contrary to their duty to judge, generally is used only for
deciding technical questions, never for assessing facts but always for
legal issues.
However, the Administrative Court of Paris chose this technique in
its Hoffman opinion and referred a question to the Conseil d’Etat on
the issue of the statute of limitations and on the possibility of a solely
symbolic compensation for the injury. Curiously enough, the
Administrative Court of Paris did not receive the answer to the
questions it asked but did receive an answer to a question it did not
ask.
Indeed, in the February 16, 2009 opinion Number 315499,19 the
Conseil d’Etat rendered a decision whereby the issue of the statute of
limitations and that of the starting point for the running of the statute
for the compensation action due to the Vichy government’s
participation in a crime against humanity were moot because,
supposedly, . . . all the wrongs had been compensated.
A simple reading of the list established by the government and
cited by the Conseil d’Etat of the people who had been compensated
shows that this list is completely inaccurate. Sub-categories of
victims did not receive anything if they did not fall into any of the
foreseen cases, either because of their nationality or because of their
relationship to those who died or for many other reasons. Except
perhaps for that which concerns the restitution of assets (which is not
assistance to colleagues who represented others in similar cases without charging
for these services.
19. This decree will be published in Lebon.
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at issue in the current trials), not one victim received a sum
comparable to that which he or she would have received had he or
she been a victim of any other violation of law, and not one received
the same amount as what Papon’s victims received.
Moreover, if one reads any administrative law textbook, one would
know that, when reparations are granted by the administration, the
courts reserve the power and the duty to assess the damages by
simply deducting the indemnities already paid.
The ruling of the Conseil d’Etat is all the more surprising
inasmuch as it does not correspond exactly to the questions the
Administrative Court of Paris posed, which concerned the allegations
of harm that could be compensated and the deductibility of the
amounts paid within the framework of joint claims. The response is
even more astonishing given that the government never maintained
that all the wrongs had been indemnified.
By declaring without the individual verification that normally
comes from the administrative courts that all of the victims had been
completely indemnified for all past wrongs, when this was not true,
the Conseil d’Etat risked encouraging anti-Semitic stereotypes
relating to money by creating the impression that they are partly
based on truth.
Of all the possible legal bases for a ruling unfavorable to the
victims, the Conseil d’Etat therefore chose the worst one. Granted, it
seems to partially make up for it by tinkering with the theme of
symbolic reparation, since it considers that ―reparations for the
exceptional suffering endured by the people who were victims of the
anti-Semitic persecution . . . call for the solemn acknowledgment of
the wrongs to which these people were collectively subjected.‖ To
begin with, this would have been more convincing if the Conseil
d’Etat had commented on its own role under the Vichy government
and its refusal after the war to apply common law principles to the
victims of Vichy.
But most of all, lumping the injuries of each individual into a
collective harm is to deny the particularity of each victim’s situation,
especially of those who did not identify with the Jewish community
or its institutions. However, this is what the Conseil d’Etat did by
pretending that the individual wrongs had already been compensated.
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IV. SOME HOPES?
Is it permissible to despair? The courts still are hearing cases. The
Conseil d’Etat as a judge of cassation theoretically maintains
independence; nevertheless, the outlook is unfavorable.
A. The Administrative Law Court
The lower courts which adjudicate issues of fact and law (the
administrative law courts and the administrative courts of appeal)20
are not bound by the ruling on a new point of law made by the
Conseil d’Etat. They are even less bound by it inasmuch as the
manner of such a decision, already questionable in its principle,
becomes even more so because the high court, instead of issuing an
abstract opinion on a point of law as the law requires, engages in
determinations of fact concerning who was indemnified or not, even
though the referral has been received with respect to a single case,
such that the court is incapable from a sheerly practical standpoint of
identifying all existing situations.
Nothing in the law prevents the administrative courts from fully
exercising their judicial powers in all the numerous ongoing lawsuits.
Nor does anything in fact prevent them from doing so, because how
would the Conseil d’Etat nullify decrees while taking into account
harms that were not compensated, or were partially compensated,
without overstepping its quashing or cassation function and intruding
on the independent rulings made by the lower courts?
There is only a faint ray of hope given that the courts rarely stray
from the case law of the Conseil d’Etat.
B. The Conseil d’Etat, Judge of Cassation21
Is there reason to hope that the Conseil d’Etat in its quashing or
cassation role will not adhere to its opinion given when sitting as a
court of referral?22 It is highly improbable because it has never yet
occurred, but legally it is possible. The only hope is that it would not
be conceivable that the formation of the cassation tribunal would
include a judge who had contributed to the February 16, 2009
20. The term used in French is juridictions du fond, which, in contrast to de
cassation, hear only issues of law.
21. This qualification of ―judge of cassation‖ is given here to distinguish the
function we saw earlier that the Conseil d’Etat assumed in the Hoffman case, in
which the court had been asked to render a legal opinion on a new point of law.
22. See id.
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decision.
C. The European Court of Human Rights
Legitimate hopes were crushed. It was hoped that the Strasbourg
court would hear issues related to the right to a fair trial and to
property rights. More particularly, it was reasonable to think that the
Conseil d’Etat’s decision largely disregards the principle that justice
requires complete indemnification of harms.
V. CONCLUSION
With the Pelletier decision, the French Conseil d’Etat finally had
agreed to apply common law to liability for the acts of the Vichy
government. The Conseil d’Etat had opened the door, only to slam it
shut a few years later with the Hoffman opinion. The result is
upsetting, despite beautiful theoretical rulings. Indeed, besides
Georges Lipietz, the only person who benefitted from the partial
correction of the law was Papon, half of whose civil liability was paid
by the State.
As for the European Court of Strasbourg, it recently23 dismissed
the claims for compensation of those who were deported on the
grounds that even the moral wrong has been repaired, which is
entirely false. It therefore affirmed the Conseil d’Etat’s decision.

Translated by Alisha L. Jacobsen, as revised by Vivian
Grosswald Curran and with footnotes in addition to those of
the author supplied by Vivian Grosswald Curran.

23. Lipietz v. France, E.Ct.H.R, (16 Dec. 2009, No. 49637/09), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=859949&por
tal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&tabl.

